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Tha sun tibia/i0 as Maria’s loot touches the surface of sand on northem
land as human contraband. . r
, She clutches her cross . . , Sweat and
vomit are thrown, and she prays and mtiocates upon the memories of
homo , . , And now she got a quota. . . . Tha needle and thread cru-
cifixion, sold and shipped across the new line of Mason Dixon. . . .
Rippin’ through denim, tha point an inch from her veinr . . . 'l'ha for \-
inan approach, his steps now pound in her brain, . l , No minutes to
rest, no moment to pray, . , r
Maria
Rage?Aguiml the Machine
Aesthetics looms large in US Latina/ o theology,1 Yet lurking be»
hind the beautiful is the monstrtx ty of a marginalized and oppressed
people which for the most part US Hispanic theology has chosen to
idealizc. This is analogous to the ataraxic theology that abstracts out
the beauty of the resurrection from a totality that includes the
wretchedness of Gethsemane and Golgotha, But as GWE Hegel
argues in the following well-known passage, abstractions Commit a
violence which reduces reality to the phantasmagorical:
tacking strength, Beauty halos the Understanding for asking of her what
it cannot do, But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death
and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that en-
dures it and maintain ‘ itself in it. It wins truth only when, in utter disA
memherment, it finds itsolt. it is this power, not as something positive
lConsidcr, for instance, the lollowing two points: first, most of the recent
literature published by U r lutina/ o theologians have in one way or another“ .e,,
theoretically and / or empiri llyv—aesthoticsas their central theme; and second, the
motif of the 2000 Annual Atoll l‘US Colloquium is "Flor 3/ ("Mylar E1 arte de [a Icologz’a,
"
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which closes its eyes to the negative, as when we say of something that it
is nothing or is false, and then, having done with it, turn away and pass
on to something else; on the contrary, Spirit i ‘ his power only by looking
the negative in the lace, and tarrying with it, s tarrying with tho ncgzr
live is the magical power that converts it into being.”
US. Hispanic theology does not tarry with the negative, the mon-
strosity of marginalization and struggle. While it acknowledges the
socioeconomic struggle of us. Latinas / us, it sublimatcs this struggle
into an aesthetic praxis which gives pride of place to the procession
over the necessity of production, which accentuates the liturgy while
eclipsing the reality of labor, which underscores the fiesta while ignore
ing the daily eight-to»five of the factory. But by doing this, theology re»
mains an abstraction, an intellectual idea. Stated in another way, rather
than formulating an aesthetics that is grounded and shaped by the
totality of reality~which for the majority of l,,atinas/os includes the
real, everyday struggle of “making" a living US, Hispanic theology
either deduces an idea of struggle from an a priori aesthetics or, worse,
it brackets the dimension of struggle altogether, But if US Hispanic
theology aims to become more than an abstraction and accepts to tarry
with the totality of US. Hispanic reality, both positive and negative,
then it must attempt to overcome the praxis—poiesxs dimension which
it itself posits; it needs to do this, for example—if we are talking ”aes—
thetics”v— through an aesthetics of struggle which only later can be sulr
lured into an aesthetics of celebration. However, if US. l’lispanic
theology opts not to accept this task of overcoming, then it must heed
the lesson of Kant’s critical philosophy and stay within the epistemo-
logical limits of its narrowly defined program‘ Put more concretely,
US, Hispanic theology must refrain from aestheticizing the monstros—
ity of marginalization and struggle, it must refrain from reducing the
totality of US. Hispanic reality to an a priori aesthetics of celebration.
Will the coming-of'age of US. Hispanic theology necessarily result in
the distancing of theological discourse from the everyday struggle of
the Latina /0 community?
This essay endeavors to grapple with some of the issues just raised
apropos US. Hispanic theology’s use of aesthetic theory, specifically
the problem of the relationship between theological discourse and the
everydayness of Latina / o reality in the United States The purpose of
this piece, then, is to critically reflect upon the nature and purpose of
both US, Hispanic theology’s appropriation of aesthetic theory and
2(3.W.F, Hegel, Plimzmrwnolngyof Spirit, trans AVV, Miller (Oxford: Oxford Uni
versity Press, WW) l9l
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US. Hispanic theologians' focus on the aesthetic experience of Lati‘
nas/os as object of analyais, But, this having been said, let me make it
clear that my contention is not that a theological aesthetics is bogus, or
that the expcrience of the beautiful by Us Hispanics IS a projection of
this or that, and thus a mystification that is unworthy of theological
reflection. Rather, my th “s‘ is that US. Hispanic theology is currently
undergoing an "aesthe turn” which is having the onerous effect of
distancing theological discourse away from the everyday struggles of
an economically, culturally, and politically dominated Us, Latina/o
community-man effect which could in the longotcrm alienate us Hig-
panic theologians from their community,
Two moments of this “aesthetic turn” need to be highlighted at the
outset. The first moment is i'pistvnmlogiczzl.The fact that an overwhelm-
ing amount of attention is being dedicated to aesthetic theory suggests
that little attention is being given to other ways of knowing, such as
social scientific and critical theoretical approaches. The second moment
is ontological. By biasing the aesthetic, Latina / o theologians are imply-
ing that the defining characteristic or element of US. Hispanic reality is
the experience of the beautiful, For to deny this presupposition would
be to admit that US. Latina/o theological discourse is an intellectual-
ized abstraction which does not correspond with the everydayness of
US. Hispanic reality. But how about the reality of domination? When
those two moments are combined and the "aesthetic turn” in US.
Latina/o theology is considered comprehensivcly, the following con—
cern arioea: the comingol'agc of a theological discourse dominated by
a theoretical and empirical concern {or the aesthetic that consequently
has a tendency of reducing the complexity of US. Hispanic reality to
the beautiful,
in what follows, then, i will attempt to critically explore this "aes-
thotlc turn” in USr l‘lispanic theology This will be done in two parts, in
the final part, I will marshal a critique of Latina / o theological aesthetics
by engaging Roberto (loilueta, in particular chapters 4 and 5 of his
Camincm 'UH limits.“ I have chosen Goizueta as my interlocutor not be—
cause he is
'cctdy fodder for my critique, but rather because his book
represents, on the one hand, what in perhaps" the most thorough eluci-
dation of a U5. l’lispanic theological aesthetics and, on the other hand,
the book attempts to develop a comprehensive theological proiect
grounded in aesthetic praxisi ln thies‘ second Sense, Goizueta’s book
cxcmplitiee the ”aesthetic problem” to the extent that it oversteps the
limits of the aesthetic theory it deploys, in the Second part i begin to
‘Roberto S, (loizueta, (Cl/Immoral» a»: [m Emmi a l-iisptmir/UzlinoTheologyof
Ammwmummt (Maryknivll, NY; ()rbis Book», 1995}.
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outline a paradigm which I believe provides a more, solid ground for a
US. Hispanic theology that aims to reflect the everydayncss of US,
Hispanic reality, Let ut» turn now to our conversation with Goizueta.
A Dialogue with Roberto Goizucm
The work of Roberto Goizueta has been ‘entral to the ad» ‘ “(“L’l'l’telll
of theological discourse in general and U ., l’lispanic theolt’igy in par-
ticular, making significant contributions to both the critique of a hyper-
intellectualized Enlightenment theology uniformed by historical
reality—and thus bereft of (:0ntent«~~and the methodology of a US
Hispanic theology which, historically caught in between European and
Latin American discourses, has not been able to adequately reflect on
its own historical, social, and cultural conditions. (ioizueta’s scholar»
ship has brought into conversation an impressive breadth oi traditions,
including the methodological contributions of Latin American libera-
tion theology, aesthetic theory, the anthropological and sociological in‘
sights of US. Hispanic popular religion, and philosophical reections
on the nuanced meaning and usage of the term "praxis." The iruits of
this conversation have more recently been ct tallized, for instance, in
the thesis that a
"theopoetics" grounded in U Hispanic popular reli«
giosity is a "necessary propaedeutic to any US Hispanic theology "'
Central to the overall trajectory of (Soizueta’s protect has been the book
Camincnms can Imus, and, in particular, its two pivotal theoretical chap:
ters: “Beauty or Justice? The Aesthetic Character of Human Action”
(chapter 4) and "Beauty and Jus : Popular Catholicism as Human
Action“ (chapter 5), Through a critical retrieval of the nomenclature,
praxis, and an appropriation of Jose Vasconcclos’s aesthetic theory as
developed in La raza casmirci, in these two chapters (Eoizueta ambi—
tiounly attempts to synthesize ”the central inSights of liberation theol‘
ogy, concerning the social transformative, or ethical'political character
of praxis, and those of Vasconcelos, concerning the aesthetic character
of praxis," in order to transcend their limits, On the one hand, what
Goizueta argues is the tendency of liberation theology to instrumental-
ize praxis by making social tranaformation the Sim qua non of human
action, and, on the other hand, the tendency of Vasconccloe’e aesthetics
to idealize or ahistoricize praxiis by divorcing human action from the
concrete particulars and vicissitudes of historical reality,5 Although he
‘Robcrto Si Goitucta, U5 l’lispanic Popular (,fatliolicisrn as
Hispunii/Lntirm ’l"lzeolznzy:(,Tlmlletz and I’mmtsr, ed. Ada Maria l§dfn
nando F lgovia (Minneapo i, (tress Press, 19%) 269.
“'(xoizucta, Camincmos my: Imus, lilil,
"heopoeticm"
., a? and hen
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deserves much merit for identifying and systematically engaging one
sided~~both materialistic and idealistic—understandingsof praxis that
have plagued theological discourse, this argument which Goizueta de-
velops in chapters 4 and 5 of Camirwmos con Issiis is not without prob-
lems in the final analysis one must wonder if he achieves the goal he
sets for himself: the development of a more comprehensive notion of
praxis that adequately balances the aesthetic, ethical-political, and
poietic moments of human action, For it appears that Goizueta’s ap-
propriation of Vasconcelos's aesthetic theory, although originally in-
tended to counter what he argues is the modern occidental tendency to
instrumentalize praxis, in fact eclipses ethical-political and poietic ac-
tion. This tendency, as we shall see below, is rooted in the dichotomy
between praxis and poiesis which Goizueta establishes at the outset of
chapter 4. Thus, it appears that when all is said and done Goizueta has
embraced an overvintellectualized understanding of praxis understood
as
"pure," non-instrumental aesthetic action, which is not adequately
informed by the fact that, for example, historically US. Hispanics have
practiced their religiosity in a context of social inequality and marginal-
ization, indeed, in the final analysis, one wonders whether Goizueta's
understanding of praxis trumps what Otto Maduro has called the ”de-
nouncing, witn sing, confronting, demanding, bridging, and not-
working" functions of US, Hispanic religion-this is to say, the socially
empowering dimensions of U 8 Hispanic religion,“
Let us now, then, trace the trajectory of the, argument Goizueta dev
velops in chapters 4 and 5 ol' Cumincirms con jesris, undergirding the
aporias and keeping on the horizon its aim: to transcend one-sided re-
cluctionistic notions of praxis by developing an understanding of this
nomenclature that properly conceptualizes what he calls the ”intrinsic
interrelationships among aesthetic action, ethical-political action, and
poie . . As we shall see, however, a discrepancy exists between
Goizueta’s attempt to integrate these three moments of human action
and the dichotomy he sets up at the outset between praxis and poiesis.
in the end, his attempt to bring together these moments of human
action remains problematical as suggested by the nebulous formula:
“Human [aesthetic] action implies ethical—politicalrelationships medi-
ated by economic relationships/’8 in the context of his overall argu-
ment, this formula, as l have already suggested, over—emphasizes the
aesthetic moment of praxis at the cost of ethicalopolitical and poietic
action.
“Otto M itluro, "Notes toward a Sociology of Latina/o Religious Empower—
ment,“ " mt {no Theology:Challengeand Promise, 165.
‘
ieta, Tamirwmos mi! #5125, l23.
Xlbid.,131,
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CHAPl’lZR 4: "BEAUTY OR JUSTICE?
THE Arssmsnc CHARACTER or HUMAN Ac'i low”
Goizueta’s point of departure in chapter 4 is the methodological
insight developed by Latin American liberation theologians of the pri-
macy of praxis over theory" This insight, he, argues, was developed by
Latin American theologians as a critique of an over-intellectualized
European theology that was blinded to the, particularities of Latin
American historical reality. “it was precisely in the context of the Latin
American experience of injustice and oppression at the hands of the
European conquistadors and missionaries,” (Soizueta writes, ”that
Latin Americans began to challenge European theologies that presup-
posed the primacy of theory, or beliefs, over praxis, or action,“0 In its
most general terms, then, this notion of the primacy of praxis over
theory can be understood as an attempt to move beyond the Cartesian
Kantian dualisms that historically have given ontological and episte~
mological primacy to mind over body, ideas over materiality, the
noumenal realm over the phenomenal realm, subjectivity over objec'
tivity, reflection over existence, With the liberation theologians
Goizueta endorses the primacy of praxis in order to transcend these
antinomies and develop a theology that is grounded in the US. His-
panic socio-historical context,“ Having identified praxis as his terminus
a quo, the question now becomes: How are we to understand this
nomenclature ”praxis”?‘-’
Thus Goizuela next turns to elucidate the development of the term
“praxis” in Western thought. lie begins by pointing out that since, the
Enlightenment, a tendency has emerged in Western thought to
instrumentalize praxis by reducing human action to "technique” or
"practicality.”13 ”This notion of praxis as instrumental action (actionvas'
manipulation, defined by its usefulness and practicality),” Goizueta
maintains, "has functioned as the interpretative horizon for all modern
Western interpretations of human actioni’“1 For him Marx is the quin-
tessential example of this Enlightenment tendency to instrumentalize
praxis, having been the first modern thinker to systematically develop
an understanding of human action rooted in production With the
Economic and Plzilosaphz'cManuscripts of 1844 in mind, Goizueta writes:
"According to Marx, it is through the act of production, through the
”mid, 78,
“‘ lbid,, 79,
” “Did, it),
'1 lbid., 8i).
Ialbidi
” lbid,, 8 l,
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creative process of working, upon our physical environment, that we
quite literally create ourselves as human persons: our products are the
concrete, obiectified expression of our very selves.""‘ Thus, he argues,
Marx reduces human action to poiesis, the human person to Homo/”aha,
and anthropology to economics. But this reading of Marx, which is
more a reductionistic Marxist reading of Marx than a sophisticated and
nuanced reading of a complex and prolific thinker, is problematic, ln'
deed, we must be attentive to the multiple notions of praxis within
Marx’s; thought, Overall, (.ioizueta argues that Marx reduces praxis to
poiesis insofar that Marx defines the first in terms of human being's
productive capacity through labor, While this interpretation may cap-
ture the spirit of orthodox or "vulgar” Marxism, one should note that
the young Marx defined the individual not so much in terms of pro-
ductive labor, but more generally, in terms of "free, conscious ac-
tivity,“M the "relations" of prcxiuction,W and the dialectic between
consciousness and society;18developed an aesthetic theory grounded in
the humanizetion of nature and the naturalization of humanity,” and
recognized the importance of language.“ In a word, the young Marx
did have a theory of intersubjectivity. In fact, for Enrique Dussel, the
'
s on intersubjective relationships is central to Marx such that “the
i t ential relation is not subject of labor/object—nature, but the relation
subject/subtext a5 a practical, ethical relationship?“ Jurgen Habermas,
“ lbid., 81.
""’ Karl Marx, l“cormmir and l’lzilo:;trpiiicMmmsrripis @1844, in The Mom Engine
Reader, ed. Robert C ‘ut'ker (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, ‘l978) 76.
’7 Karl Marx, The mmm Ideology,in ibid., 157,
"i For instance, >rding to Marx: “The materialist doctrine that men are prod
ucts of circuinstanc nd upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are prod—
ucts of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who
change circumstanc and that it i essential to educate the educator himself, Hence,
this doctrine nece arily arrives at viding society into two parts, one of which is
superior to society.” ‘llird il‘Lblb; on Feuerbarh, in ibid, 144.
WThe following passage where the young Marx lays out his aesthetic under-
standing of human being, “Only through the objective unfolded richness of man's
essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility (a musical ear, an eye
for the beauty of tom n short, sense capable of human graiiiications, sense con-
firming themgelves at , t nrial powers of rimn) either cultivated or brought into
being, For not only the five senses but also the Stu-called mental sense—the practical
senses (will, love, otc,)-wiu a word, human sonsewthe humanne s of the sensesW
comes to he by virtue of its object, by virtue of humanized nature. Therming of the
five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present” Eco-
nomic and li’ltilosophir‘Manuscripts 011844, in uid, 88-9,
"‘ Karl Marx, Th2? German [Lieu , in nd, 158,
1‘ Enrique Dussel, The ul‘ldt’fldt? ifMutlernity: April,Rirmmr, Rnriy, lizylor,and the
Philosophy oiliil/emtiort, trims. and ed, Eduardo Mendiem (New Jersey: Humanities
Press, 19%) 220.
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in contradisrinction, tends to read Marx as having a tendency to reduce
interaction to labor, communicative action to imtrumental action,
praxis to poiesis, yet, at the same time, he recognizes, for instance,
through his thesis of the “colonization of the Lebeimwlt,” that the prob-
lem is not labor / instrumental action/ poiesis, but rather its reitication.22
Although we cannot go into specifics here, suffice it for now to
undergird a few points that are not by any means intended to do itistice
to the complexity of Marx’s thought, but only muddy the waters, so to
speak, in order to move us away from the simple equation which
Goizueta adopts: Marx : praxis —> poiesis. First, while Marx did over—
emphasize production and material conditions, he did not do this to
any greater degree than, for instance, Kant and Hegel de'emphasized
them; or stated posttively, to any greater degree than Kant and Hegel
over-emphasized reection and ideal conditions, Second—and related
to the firstwfor hermeneutical reasons, it is critical to point out that
Marx was writing in reaction to German Idealism and the naive
“Robinson Crusoe" assumptions of classical economics This fact must
be taken into consideration when interpreting and / or retrieving Marx.
ian thought. Third, Marx provided us with what perhaps was the first
critical theory of the instrumentalization—--or to use his parlance—the
”commodification” of nature, the individual, and society. Taking as his
point of departure the vantage point of the oppressed and marginal-
ized wage-laborer, he unmasked the exploitative logic of the capitalism
of his day. At this point we can begin to see the affinities that exist be‘
tween Marx and liberation theology, in particular liberation theology's
emphasis on a critical and liberating praxis conscious of material depri»
vation and institutional oppression, the marginalized other, and the
like. For these reasons it is disconcerting that Goizueta uses Marx only
as a foil, failing to engage him constructively, Here, with this reading of
Marx, we have in germ the dichotomy between pmxis and poiesus that,
as we shall see, will untold as Goizueta’s argument develops.
Having exposed the Enlightenment tendency to instrumentalize
praxis, and having shown how the work of Marx epitomizes this
tendency, Goizueta next turns to Aristotle in an attempt to retrieve a
non-reductionistic understanding of the term that could serve as a
corrective to modernity/s instrumentalist bias. Aristotle understood
praxis, argues Goizueta, as intersubjective action, or in other words, as
2"The theory of the relationship between labor and interaction is a central
thread that runs through Hubermas/s entire corpus
“
e tori stance, ”itchnology
and Science as ‘ldeology,”' 'Iiiwimi i2 Rational Society (Boston leacon Press, 1970).
Thomas McCarthy provide; an excellent synopsis oi this theme in The Critical
Theory ufliirgt'rl Habermtzs (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Frees, 19%) lo-«lO,
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“all human activity whose end is internal rather than external to itself,
i.e., all human activity which is an end in itself.”23 For Aristotle, then,
praxis is diametrically opposed to poiesis or production, which he
understood as all human action having an external or instrumental
end. “When we produce, or make something,” Goizueta explains, "the
activity of producing or making has no intrinsic end. The end of pro-
duction is not the action itself, but the object (product) which results
from the action after the action is already completed. Whereas praxis is
its own reward, the reward of poiesis is in its results, what is left over
after the activity of production is completed/’2‘ Thus we have the Aris-
totelian dichotomy between praxis and poiesis. Goizueta provides
several examples of this dichotomy: For instance, he suggests that
analogous to the dichotomy between praxis and poiesis is the differ-
ence between the activities of “making a home” and "making a house,”
and “playing a musical instrument" and ”making a musical instru-
ment/'3‘ For the value of making a home and playing a musical instruA
ment, Goizueta argues, are intrinsic to the activity and, thus, are
praxeological. In contradistinction, the value of making a house and
making a musical instrument, he posits, are extrinsic to the activity,
having to do with the technical or instrumental action and the manipu—
lation and transformation of nature, and thus are poietici But, in addi-
tion to the polarization of praxis and poiesis which, as we shall see, is
already problematic to the extent that it is an intellectualization of real‘
ity, problematic too is the normative move inherent in this dichotomy
where the rst, praxis, is a prior-i valued more than the second, poiesis.
Thus, according to this Aristotelian framework which Goizueta is
endorsing, on the one side we have the more “pure” and “valuable”
intersubiective activity understood as an end-in-itself and having as its
object interaction or communication. And, on the other side, we have
the more “vulgar” and technical or productive activity understood in~
strumentally, the purpose of which is the transformation of nature qua
materiality
But this dichotomy, although heuristically useful for the scholar
and the intellectual, becomes dubious to the extent that it does violence
to the praxis of everyday realityuwhich is to say, the everyday praxis
of the average individual. For in reality praxis and poiesis are inter-
related. On the one hand, poiesis is a condition for the possibility of
praxis. For instance, in order to engage in intersubjective action, one
must meet certain metabolic conditions, which consequently must be
l‘(loizuetm Camimmms am [0912s,82.
7* Ibid., 83.
“3 lbid.
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produced. In order to make a home one must have a house, apartment,
shanty, or some kind of space that provides the family with the mater-
ial and spatial conditions needed for interaction; this residence must be
produced. In order to play a musical instrument, one must first have a
musical instrument, i.e., one must directly produce or purchase (indi-
rectly produce) the musical instrument. 0n the other hand, no poietic
action is completely bereft of praxis, or, stated in positive terms, poietic
action presupposes praxis to the extent that production is a social and
thus communicative activity And this holds a fortiori for the industri-
alized society with its complex division of labor, what Durkheim
termed ”organic solidarity,” to emphasize its interrelated nature.26
What we are trying to suggest here ‘s that this antinomy which
Goizueta adopts between praxis and poiesis, between intersubjectivity
and production, between Aristotle and Marx, starts to become fuzzy as
we move away from an intellectual analysis and attempt to grasp the
concrete and particular real praxis of everyday life, what Ada Maria
isasi-Diaz has termed [a lucha to describe the daily struggle of the US.
Hispanic community."
We should add, furthermore, that the Aristotelian distinction be-
tween praxis as interaction and poiesis as production is not a given.
Consider, for instance, Martin Heidegger’s understanding of poiesis as
a bringing-forth ’Her‘vowbringm,’ and techne as a mode of revealing,
i.e., of actively—via human actionabringing—forth truth (aletheia).2*3
This interpretation blows‘up Aristotle's distinction, conceptualizing
poiesis against a radically different hermeneutical horizon. Moreover,
from another angle, granting Aristotle his dichotomy, it nevertheless
becomes problematic when we consider the fact that this dichotomy
2“ Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: The Free Press,
1984).
3’ Ada Maria lsasi~Diaz, £11 In Lac/ia/hx the Struggle: tjlabm'utiizga Mujnisln Thrill»
ogy (Minneapolis: Fortress l’r iss, 1993).
1“ Heidegger continues thus: "Aristotle, in a disc sion of special importance
(Nicomacheim Ethics, Book Vl, chaps. 3 and 4), dis nguiches between cplsteme and
techne and indeed with respect to what and how they reveal. ’I‘echne is a mode of
aleflirurz'n. It reveals whatever does not bring itself torth and does. not yet lie here
before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another. Whoever
builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals what is to be brought
forth, according to the perspectives of the tour modes of occusioning. This revealing
gathers together in advance the aspect and the matter of ship or house, with a view
to the finished thing envisioned as completed, and from this gathering determines
the manner of its construction. Thus what is decisive in incline does not lie at all in
making and manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the aforemen‘
tioned revealing. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that {crime is a bring;
ing forth.“ Martin Heidegger, "The Question Conceming 'llechnology,” 'I'lzr Question
ConcerningTechnologyand Other Essays (New York: Harper 3: Row, 1977) l3.
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was only possible given the division of labor that existed in the Greek
polls where the slaves, which were, responsible, for all production, pru-
duml the conditions for the possibility for the free (male) Athenians to
engage in the bins“ polilikos.“ We can begin to see that, although Goizueta
wants to trail ind-w s we already suggested—the dichotomy be-
tween theory and praxis by taking as his point of departure the second,
he ends up with another one: the dichotomy between praxis and
pole.
'
But, as we shall see, this s not Goizueta’s nitention; this is ex-
plicitly clear at the, end of chapter 5 where he argues for their integra-
tion.” Thus the question remains: How can, on the one hand, Goizueta
endorse the Aristotelian dichotomy between praxis and poiesis, and,
on the, other hand, seek to synthesize these? This aporia is problemati—
cal indeed.
Having purged praxis of instrumentalization through a retrieval of
Aristotle’s praxis-poiesis dichotomy, Goizueta next moves to an assess.
ment of how liberation theologians have traditionally appropriated the
nomenclature praxis. He argues that due to their emphasis on libera-
tion as social transformation, liberation theologians, like Marx, are
plagued by an ambiguous understanding of praxis as social trans.
formation.“ Although Goizueta maintains that the central contribution
made by liberation theologians to theological discourse is the notion
that ”the lived commitment to social justice is itself an essential, intrin-
“c dimension of any authentic Christian faith/’32 at the same time he
argues that when social transformation (in the sense of trying to
achieve a more iuot society) is viewed as the “result” or the "prod uct"
of praxis, then the problem emerges in the form of the instrumentalizw
tion of praxis. But here we must point out some difficulties with
Goizueta’s argument, Granting him the dichotomy between praxis and
poiesis, which, as we already intimated, i5 disputable and which we
will take issue with later, first, Goizueta’s treatment of liberation theol-
ogy remains igue. For instance, other than Gustavo Gutierrez who he
directly engages, which other liberation theologians does he have in
2"Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (C icago: University of Chicago Press,
#158), no especially chapter 4: “The Public and the Private Realm," 22-78.
-
oizueta, Caminemti w: It’bllS,131.
oizuvtu explainu: “in liberation theology, the emphasis on liberating praxis,
or liberating social action, reec ' ’ 'milar ambiguity [as the one present in Marx}:
15 liberation the 1‘65“]! of praxis, that is the product of our struggle to transform so—
ciety? Or, is liberation a mnconnlmt, or byproduct, of praxi ~i.e., the change that
takes place in us as we engage in that struggle? Do we bQCOllle liberated only after
and as ii result of our social action, or do we become liberated in the course of action?
ls praxis, or human action its own end and, thus, valuable in and of itself, or is
praxis valuable only insofar as it leads to a liberated Society?" lbid., 86—7.
5” lbid., 88,
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mind? For as Goizueta rightly sugge s, the term ”praxis” has been
used in numerous and diverse ways,
* Thus, we must ask if it is even
possible to develop, as Goizueta does, a critique of liberation theology
in the general sense without being roductionistic.
Here there emerges a hermeneutical tension analogous to the one
present in Goizueta’s treatment of Marx. For just as the View that Marx
over-emphasized the notion of praxis as production has to be placed in
the context of his critique of German Idealism and his point of depar-
ture, viz,, the exploited wage-laborer, so too the view that liberation
theologians over-emphasize social transformation, and thus, instru-
mentalize praxis, has to be placed in the context of liberation theology’s
critique of an intellectualized Enlightenment theology and its point of
departure, viz, the marginalized poor. Second, Goizueta is unclear as
to who is the subject of liberation Is it the Other who lives in wretched
poverty and will go to bed hungry tonight? Or is it we, who, as good
Christians, are committed to social justice and thus ”become liberated
in the course of action”? Third, (Joizueta’s understanding of what we
could call the intentionality of liberation is problematical. This becomes
clear with his distinction between liberation as a “product” or as a
"concomitant” of praxis.“ in other words, it praxis is instrumentalized,
as Goizueta argues, when liberation is understood as the explicit
"result” or “product" of praxis, then how are we to understand the
Christian ”commitment to social justice” which seems to imply a con.
scious and active struggle for a certain understanding of liberation via
social transformation? It seems that here, by arguing that liberation
cannot be the conscious intention of individuals, or stated positively,
that it has to be a "concomitant” of praxis, (Soizueta is undermining, or
at least problematizing, agency, Fourth, how does Goizueta understand
the relationship between “liberation" and “social transformation”? ()n
3“ lbid,, 87,
l‘lbidl, 86, Later in chapter 8 Goizueta more explicitly ClQVOltlpSthis notion as
follows: ”Social and personal improvement are certainly def able goals l’aradoxiv
cally however, it we view human life as but a means to those, noble goals, we will
never attain them. it our goal is a just society, where all human persons are valued,
affirmed, and loved as an end in themselves, as genuine ’others,’ we cannot arrive
at that goal through an instrurncntalizaiion of persons which contradicts the very
goal itself, At its most basic level justice, like happin is not H product but a con-
comitant, or byproduct, of human life when that lift \ ived and valued as an end in
itself. like human happiness in general, social justice and personal growth or trans
formation are not directlyvintended ’products' of the ’work’ the individual person
undertakes respectively 'on’ society, or ’orl’ himself or herself, Rather, theae are but
byproducts of the person’s interaction with others. in short, the only gustice and the
only true self-improvement or personal growth is that which is the unintended (di-
rectly, at least) consequence of the person's active low of others. This is simply anv
other way of expressing the paradox of the rms,” lbid,, 107.
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the one hand, he agrees that the Christian’s commitment to social justice
is essential, but, on the other hand, he is critical of liberation theolo'
gians' tendency to instrumentalize praxis through their focus on social
transformation. But how can there be social justice without some kind
of social transformation? Furthermore, how can Goizueta argue that
”the poor become liberated in the process of the struggle itself"?5 For
this seems to presuppose another understanding of liberation—per»
haps a kind of spiritual liberationwwhich moves away from the notion
of historical liberation via social justice that is so central to liberation
theology.
Moreover, the notion of "social transformation” can be approached
from many different angles and can mean many different things—«for
instance, it can vary in terms of scope, degree, and participation. Thus,
for reasons we just noted, Goizueta cannot categorically reject the aim
of social transformation and at the same time endorse the Christian
commitment to social justice; yet he is critical of the emphasis libera»
tion theologians give to social transformation. Therefore, what kind of
transformation troubles him? What kind would he accept? This he
never clarifies. These aporias present in Goizueta's critique of libera-
tion theology undergird, from another angle, the problems that exist
with the dichotomization of praxis and poiesis. For it one takes serie
ously the Christian commitment to social justice, then some degree of
what Goizueta would call the instrumentalization of praxis is in-
evitable. Similarly, if one takes seriously the everyday praxis of the
average individual, then it becomes clear that the difference between
intersubjective and instrumental action are fluid. For this reason, lest
we desire to fall captive to abstractions and intellectualizations as, for
instance, the idea of the thing or value irritself, the dichotomy between
pt’aXlSand poiesis must be sundered. In this sense, Goizueta’s notion of
praxis is problematic because rather than allowing the reality of human
action to shape his idea of praxis, instead he tries to shape the reality of
human action with his idea of a nonvinstrumontalized praxis, And in
this sense, he is making the same mistake which, according to Marx,
Hegel made: confusing the things of logic for the logic of things.36But
we will come back to this below; now let us continue with Goizueta’s
argument.
In an attempt to rescue liberation theologians from what, as we
saw, he argues is the "ambiguity” of an instrumentalized praxis,
Goizueta turns to Latin American aesthetic theory for a retrieval of an
”lbid.
5‘“ Pierre Bourdicu, Thu logic of Practice (Stanford, Ca
Press, 1990) 17.
Stanford University
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intersubiective understanding of human action. He turrus in particular
to lose Vasconcelos whose aesthetics provide us, Goizueta argues, with
a framework for conceptualizing a nonuinstrumentalizcd praxis in its
concrete particularity, and in this sense taking us beyond the Aris-
totelian understanding of the term. According to Goizucta, for Vascon-
celos ”logical reason is the most abstract human operation. . . . Ethics
is less abstract, since it concerns concrete human acts, rather than ideas
or concepts. The least abstract, however, is aesthetics, which concerns
not the separate acts, but the living itself. Thus, reason is superseded by
ethics, but ethics is superseded by love, in, aesthetic, affective
union."37 It is the ”aesthetic sense" that allows us to grasp life as an
end-in-itsclf, as something free of instrumentalization. This is why
Goizueta goes on to argue that “play, recreation, and celebration are the
most authentic forms of life precisely because, when we are playing,
recreating, or celebrating we are immersed in, or ’fused’ with the action
itself, and those other persons with whom we are participating”'m
From a theological perspective, this sense of life-as-celebration is exem-
plified in the liturgy Thus Goizueta sees in Vasconcelos’s aesthetic the'
ory the ground and horizon for the notion of praxis he aims to develop,
i.e,, intersubjective human action viewed as an end-in-itsclt, Moreover,
as we already mentioned, he also views Vasconcelos’s aesthetics as a
promising paradigm because of its emphasis on the ”emphatic fusion”
of concrete particulars which he sees as an assuring safeguard against
abstractions and intellectualizations of the kind liberation theologians
critiqued.”
But with this notion of ”aesthetic praxis,” and this talk of "celebrav
tion,” “recreation," and ”play,” we seem to have significantly distanced
ourselves from the Christian commitment to social justice. indeed, the
horizon established by aesthetic praxis of a non-instrumentalized inter-
subicctive action understood as an end-in—itseh‘, and grounded in the
concrete particularity of an emphatic fusion, seems to be diametrically
opposed to the horizon established by the liberating praxis of liberav
rion theology’s commitment to social justice, which, as we noted above,
always implies a certain kind of social transformation. In other words,
we now have, according to Goizueta’s paradigm, on the one hand,
aesthetic praxis which recognizes life as an endlin~itseli and which
fully manifests itself in the liturgical celebration, and, on the other hand,
we have liberating praxis which explicitly recognizes the need to bring
about or "produce” social justice But at this point in the argument,
3’ Goizueta, Cumincmus czm [15125,93.
”lbid, 94,
5“ lbidi, 97-9.
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having argued a few pages earlier that an ambiguity exists in liberation
theology/s notion of praxis, and having retrieved the notion of aesthetic
praxis as a corrective, (Joizueta brings out another ambiguity: the am-
biguity inherent in Vasconcelos’s project, which he later, in chapter 5,
will argue is due to the lact that Vasconcelos ”pays little attention to the
economic, or poietic dimensions of human action/’4‘“ How are we to
make sense of this? For we seem to be caught in between the recogniu
tion that liberation theology instrumentalizes praxis by emphasizing
social transformation (ie, poietic action) and the recognition that
Vasconcelos idealizes praxis by failing to ground his aesthetic praxis in
the socio-historical conditions.‘1 If, as we have already suggested,
Goizueta’s ultimate aim is to develop an integrated understanding of
praxis that can push beyond onesided reductions, then why does he
continue to labor under the assumptions of the praxis—poiesis di'
chotoiny? Why not from the outset work within a paradigm that recog—
nizes the poietic conditions ol praxis and the praxeological conditions
of poiesis? Or, in other words, why not work within a paradigm which
recognizes the fact that in reality praxis and poiesis exist interlocked
and cannot be so neatly segregated, except via ”world? For if Goizueta
would begin with the reality of a human praxis that, from the subjec-
tive side, is understood ontogenetically, iiei, understood as morally and
cognitively changing through a dialectic with other subjects, with his-
tory / society and with nature, and, from the objective side, is under-
stood as immersed, and thus conditioned by the social conditions of
existence, then he would not be able to conceptualize praxis and
poiesis as separated, Thus, the question that looms large at the end of
chapter 4 is: Will Goizueta be able to overcome this dichotomy he has
established between praxis and poiesis, beauty and justice, Aristotle/
Vasconcelos and Marx, intersubjectivity and production, celebration
and transformation?
CHAPTER 5: ”Beaurr AND jUSl‘tLitE:
POPULAR Can-tor K‘ISM AS HUMAN Ac‘iioN”
Goizueta begins chapter 5 with the claim that popular religion—‘—
and given the scope of his book, specically popular Catholicism-— has
come to be understood by US Hispanic theologians as "foundational
pmxis, that paradigmatic human activity which grounds our theologi-
cal reflection,” For according to him, the human action that defines
Whirl, 12],
ii
i, meta writes: “it, in liberation theology, the identification of praxis with
liberation contained latent ambiguities, Va oncelos's interpretation of the Spanish
conquest reveals the dangerous ambiguities inherent in his own project.” uid, 99.
“libido 102.
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popular religion is an emblematic manifestation of what we described
earlier as aesthetic praxis, First, popular religious action is Sacra mental
as it is always mediated by physical symbols,“3pointing to the fact that
our relationship to God is always expressed in concrete particularities,
ie, it always “involves embodied action in the world.” Second, popu-
lar religious action is dramaturgical, ie, it is a performance, an acting
where participation in a liturgical ritual of commemoration is an end-
itself. Third, popular religious action is intersubjective, i.e., an inter-
action among subjects. Thus, given these characteristics, Goizueta
argues that the human action that defines popular religion safeguards
against the reduction of praxis to poiesis and against technological or
productive relationships, T his is why, he argues, "popular Catholicism
is the liturgical celebration of life as an end in itself, life as plant's/’45
But given the dichotomy between praxis and poiesis which, as we
saw, he appropriated in chapter 4, and his understanding of popular
religion as the locus of aesthetic praxis par excellence, Goizueta now
perpetuates, through an analysis of popular religion, the polarization
between intersubjective celebration and social transformation specifi-
cally in the religious sphere, From within this rubric religion is reduced
to the end'in-itself of an idealized (aesthetic) celebration bereft of all
social awareness, and thus bereft of its socially empowering and ber.
ating dimension. But this is a View that is grounded on the presupposi-
tion of a human action that seeks an idealized non'instrumentalized
praxis and which avoids poiesis like the plague. However, as we have
been saying all along, this is an abstraction, for in reality, as Otto
Maduro maintains, religion is ”immersed in a complex and mobile net-
work of social relationships,”4"6ie, it is a ”socially situated reality."47
Similarly individuals do not go through lite differentiating between
interaction and labor. Rather, in everyday practice, the individual lives
in the fuzzy in-between of interaction and labor, in a word, praxls and
poiesis, as We have already suggested, cannot be segregated except
through a via inlallectiva.
‘3
"Such as the bread that is shared and the owers placed on lesus' corpse, by
physical gestures, such as kissing the crucix or kneeling alongside Mary, by physi-
cal movement and processions, by singing songs and playing musical instruments,
and by the very physical effort exerted in preparing the church for the celebration”
Find, “)3
“ lbidi
‘zlbidv, 105.
“Otto Maduro, Rcz’igionand Social Conflicts (lviaryluioll, NY; Orbis Books, U982)
15.
‘7 lbid., 43.
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Nevertheless, toward the middle of chapter 5 Goizueta is still in«
sisting on the dichotomy between praxis and poiesis, This allows him
to claim: “Only when intersubjective human action is lived out as an
end in itself, as something to be affirmed and celebrated regardless of
the ‘outcome,’ can relationships become sources of individual empowerv
ment and human liberation/“8 This claim highlights at least three prob-
lems which, as we have been pointing to from the outset, are related to
a dichotomy that embraces praxis and snuffs poiesi First, the notion
of a self—sustainingintersubiective action is an abstraction, for all inter-
action has a poietic dimension in the form of food, drink, shelter, social
stability, and the like (just as the inverse is true: all production has an
interactive dimension) Second, the notion of an intersubjectivity that is
completely at peace about ”outcome,” i,e., completely at peace about
social transformation and material conditions, is also an abstraction,
for it presupposes—and here we go back to the first—that the material
(poietic) conditions for the possibility of interaction exist or, better,
have been met. For who could deny the intrinsically poietic implica-
tions of an interaction where the Other makes it known that she is hun-
gry or that the social structures—ace” the labor market, immigration
policy, etc—are oppressing her? Third, and analogously, the notion of
"empowerment and human liberation" not concerned with ”outcome”
which Goizuetu speaks of is of a spiritual nature and must be distin-
guished from material and St ‘iul empowerment and liberation which
always imply poietic action.
Although Goizueta had been arguing all along, for a dichotomy be-
tween praxis and poies s a safeguard against the instrumentalization
of praxis, toward the middle of chapter 5 he makes a radical break with
this logic, and argues for the interrelationship of praxis and poiesis or
what he more specifically calls the “intrinsic interrelationships among
aesthetic action, ethical—politicalaction, and poiesis,”“° which he argues
follows from the fact that "cultural symbols and practices are always
mediated by political and economic structures and relationshi p515“But
this claim which emerges ex Hill/o, that aesthetic action always implies
some kind of ”ethical-political responsibility , i , expressed through
transformation of unjust relationships of production," is diametrically
opposed to the dichotomy Goizueta developed for more than forty
pages, from the beginning, oi chapter 4 through most of chapter 55“
“(joizueta Cnmimtmos om Icsiis, ill,
“' lhid., 12,3
Whit, 127
5‘ i‘lueta states: "if the ethicalpolitical dimension of human action is subor-
dinated to the aesthetic, as a prior, inferior stage, in the latter’s development, ethical-
political struggles for justice and against exploitation will be subordinated to the
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Two questions arise at this juncture: First, why did Goizueta appropri-
ate the praxiSvpoiesis dichotomy if his aim all along was to develop an
understanding of the interrelationship between praxis and poiesis?
Second, given this shift, what paradigm does he offer us to justify this
move? These aporias loom large at the end of chapter 5, and this is why
the following formula which Goizueta deploys as a way of integrating
the moments of human actionuaesthetic, ethical-political, and eco-
nomic—remains vague:
Human intersubjective action is "beautiful” and, as such, is its own end;
the fundamental nature of human action is thus enjoyment, celebration,
and worship; and human action implies ethical—politicalrelationships
mediated by economic relationships; the intrinsic beauty of life is experi-
enced only in the struggle to make these more equitable Worship and
celebration are always aesthetic and ethical-political acts that are medi~
ated by economic products and structures“
ln light of the aporias we have been suggesting, are present in
Goizueta's argument, consider the following two reflections by Marx
and Bourdieu on the spurious visit) dei of a theoria uniformed by the real
or actual conditions of existence, First Marx on the genesis of the intel»
lectual bias:
Div ion of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a
division of material and mental labour appears. From this moment on-
wards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other
than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents some-
thing without representing something real; from now on consciousness
is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and proceed to the
formation of “pure” theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc,“
Now here is Bourdieu in a less reductionistic tone, building on Marx:
The unanalyzed element in every theoretical analysis (whether subjec-
tivist or objectivist) is the theorists subjective relation to the social world
and the objective (social) relation presupposed by this subjective relation.
lntellectualism is, so to speak, an ”intellectualocentrism” in which the
desire for affective union- »-rather than seen as the necessary mediation of empathic
fusion, if the highest form of human action is the ability to “feel with’ another per—
son, the ethical—political responsibility entailed in that empathy can too easily be
evaded: true empathy is rooted and issues in ethical-political action, which must, in
turn, be expressed through a transformation of unjust relationships of production.
Empathy implies and is made manifest in ethical-political action.” lbidv 125.
zlbidw 13].
‘5 Marx, The German Ideology,in The Marx-Engels Readi't. 159.
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observer’s relation to the social world, and therefore the social relation
which makes observation pt, le, is made the basi of the practice
analyzed, through the representations constructed to account for it,“
"l'hesc two citations serve as a propaedeutic to the new paradigm that
will be sketched in the following section, For as we maintained above,
on the one hand, with the liberation theologians Goizueta recognizes
the need for taking praxis as his terminus a quo in order to overcome a
hyperintellectualized Enlightenment theology; in this sense, Goizueta
recognizes the need to correct the intellectual bias of a “pure” theology.
On the other hand, however, Goizueta understands praxis as idea, and,
in this sense, he still remains captive to the intellectual bias, For, as we
argued above, Goizueta begins with an a priori notion of praxis as
intersubjective action understood as an end-in—itself and then wants to
make this notion shape reality, rather than beginning with reality, i.e.,
with human action in everyday practice—«and have this point of deparc
ture shape his understanding, of praxis. It is this intellectualized under.
standing of praxis that allows Goizueta's prax1$~poiesis dichotomy to
hold sway, From a more concrete perspective, if Goizueta would begin
with the concrete everyday reality of a historically marginalized US
Hispanic/lutino community, and allow the everydayness of this real-
ity to illumine his notion of praxis, then he could never divorce the aes—
thetic praxeological moment of US. Hispanic popular religion from its
socially transforiningwand thus socially empowering and liberating—
moment (in, what Goizueta refers to as the poietic or ethical~political
and economic moments), For in reality, as we stated earlier, and as shall
now be developed, praxis and poiesis, communicative and instrument
tal modes of action, the aesthetic and the economic are interlocked and
exist as one complex reality.
Toward a New Paradigm
After having critically engaged the central argument of what is per-
haps the chief contribution of one of the leading US, Hispanic theolo-
gians, the query raised at the outset must again be posed: will the
coming—of—ageof US. Hispanic theology necessarily result in the
distancing of theological discourse from the everyday struggle of
Latinas/Os in the United States? it we take (Soizueta's project as cm-
blematic of the current trend in Latina/o theology, then this query
must be answered in the affirmative. For, as we have seen, U5. His.
panic theological discourse is marked by a bias to abstract the religious
“ Bourdieu, Tim Lugicof Practice, 29.
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aspect from the everyday totality of US. Hispanic reality. 'l'hii s to say,
instead of allowing US, Hispanic reality to shape theological dis—
course, Latina / o theology in the United States begins with certain con—
ceptual a prioris and {its Hispanic reality into these concepts. And this
is precisely what i called above the tendency to ”intellectualize” the
everydayness of US. Hispanic reality. Both the disproportionate
amount of attention being dedicated to theological aesthetics and the
religio—aesthetic experiences of US, Latinos and the attempt to ground
US. Hispanic theology in an aesthetic theorym-ie, what 1 have re—
ferred to as the two central aspects of the “aesthetic turn” in US. His-
panic theology—are symptomatic of this state of affairs, Which Latino
theologian would deny that US. Hispanics are an oppressed people?
Who would deny that those asymmetrical power structures that keep
the Latina/o down need to be transformed? But how, I ask, does US,
Hispanic theological discourse reflect the monstrosity of oppression?
How does it contribute—albeit intellectueilly’to the critique of unjust
structures and to the creation of a society where the Latino worker
would be freed from the yoke of an oppressive labor market that is held
in place by the ideology of ”minimum wage,” a society where the
Latino culture would no longer be colonized, instrumentalized, and re-
duced to, for instance, the fast—food aphorism ”Yo quiero Taco Bell"?
Indeed, I fail to see how US. Hispanic theology speaks to the mon‘
strosity of oppression which defines the everydayness of Latino reality
in the United States. A theology that consecrates a chimerical thing—or
cnd'in-itself and marshals an a priori critique of poietic action is one
that is held captive by the idealistic tradition of Western philosophy
and deserves to be called “the opium of the people,“ Such a theology,
moreover, has no right to call itself "liberationit indeed, the distinc—
tion needs to be made between oppressive and (imancipatory poietic
action, Yes, no doubt, the procession, the liturgy, and the fiesta are im-
portant objects of theological reflection, but when these become the
only objects, or when these are reitied to such a degree that they eclipse
the everyday reality of production, labor, and the factory, then U5. His-
panic theology no longer reflects the daily Straggle of the Latino people,
but rather it reflects the religious practiccs oft: struggling Hispanic people
—and these represent two radically different proiec ‘
However, US. Hispanic theology explicitly claims to reflect upon
the everydayness of US Hispanic reality in its multiplex totality, does
it not? Is this not why Latina / o theologians have opted to make popu-
lar religious beliefs and practices their primary unit oi analysis, have
"Marx, Cuntributlmz to the Critique of Hegel/5Philosophy of Right Introduction,
in The Marxiugels Reader, 54.
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appropriated the notion of “praxis” from the Latin American libera-
tionist tradition, and have developed concepts such as In luclza, lo
colidiano, and the like? But one has to seriously question whether US.
Hispanic theology has been able to achieve the ambitious task of re-
flec mg on the everyday reality of Latinas / 05 in the United States For
this task must be able to grasp the interrelatedness of the procession
and production, liturgy and labor, fiesta and the factory, i.e,, it must be
able to grasp these as forming aspects of one complex reality. So, for in-
stance, this theological project must attempt to, on the one hand, reect
upon how the internalization of the structures and symbols of the pro.
cession, liturgy, and fiesta are manifested and shape the structures and
symbols of production, labor, and the factory; conversely, this theologi-
cal project must attempt to grasp how the internalization of the struc‘
tu res and symbols of production, labor, and the factory are manifested
and shape the procession, liturgy, and fiesta, For example, a US, His-
panic theology that aims to grasp the everyday reality of US, Latinos
(as opposed to grasping the religious practices of a struggling Hispanic
people) would need to explore what it theologically means for the
Latino construction worker or security guard to carry a picture of the
Virgen de Guadalupe in his wallet, or for the Latina to keep an image of
the cross on her desk, or for the Hispanic couple to pray the rosary dur-
ing their daily ritual of cleaning offices or picking vegetables. More—
over, this first kind of theological project would also need to investigate
the way in which US. Hispanic religious worldviews and practices are
affected by the fatigue of six days of loading and unloading trucks, or
by the psychological violence produced by having to interact with non-
Spanish speaking coworkers, or of having to rush off to work after the
Sunday service or the Feast Day procession,‘6 In short, a Hispanic the—
ology that claims to reflect the everyday reality of Latinos in the United
States has to be able to grasp the fuzziness of a religiosity that both
shapes the daily struggle of the Hispanic people and is shaped by this
struggle,
From what has been said thus far it would be most accurate to de»
scribe US. Hispanic theological discourse as a reection on the reli-
‘m‘l‘hat I am not simply waxing elegantly, and that my concern is empirically
justied, consider the following: Just a few Sundays ago, after the 11 AM. mass at
the Misii’m Carolica in Atlanta, a conversation l was having with a man of Latino
origin had to come to an untimely end because the brother had to rush oil to work.
As he was leaving he expressed his gratitude for having had hall the day off which
had allowed him to attend the service that day; yet in the same breath he expressed
regret for not having been able to attend mass the previous Sunday, and, looking
ahead, he lamented the fact that lie was most likely not going to be able to attend
mass the following Sunday—both because of work.
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gious beliefs and practices of a struggling Latino community, rather
than as a reflection on the everydayness of U .8. Hispanic reality, For
how can a theology that does not tarry with the negative of oppression
claim to reect the totality of US. Hispanic reality? This is a contradic-
tion as well as ideology As it currently exists, US Hispanic theology
needs to accept the limits of its gaze. it needs to accept, for instance, the
fact that when it talks about “praxis” it actually means explicitly reli-
gious praxis; when it speaks of lo culidiano it in fact means In mtidiimo
vis-a—vis the religious sphere. Indeed, it Latino theology wants to gen»
uinely capture the everydayn s of Us. Hispanic reality, then it will
have to break with those philosophical, theoretical, and/or method.
ological presuppositions which prevent it from engaging the oppres-
sion and struggle that is so characteristic of us. Hispanic reality,
in what follows i will begin to sketch in a strictly preliminary way
a paradigm that attempts to overcome the idealism and dichotomies of
us. Hispanic theology—a paradigm that aims to provide a more solid
foundation for a theology that wants to reflect upon the everydayness
of Latina / o reality. The first two stages 0t this paradigm will begin to
be developed here, and the third stage will only be outlined, First, a
new horizon will be opened up by Xavier Zuhiri’s insight on the pri-
macy of reality over being and intelligence Second, the metaphysical
ground will be laid by Ignacio Ellacuria’s notion of historical reality.
The phenomenology of suffering as the proper point of departure of
US. Hispanic theology will be outlined as the third stage,
XAVlER ZUBlRl AND ’l't " l’RIMAcy or REALITY
OVER BEING AND INTELLIGENCE
Xavier Zubiri’s critique of Western metaphysics loosens the philo'
sophical problematic lurking behind US. Hispanic theology and in this
sense brings forth the necessary material for the ground laying of the
new paradigm. Here, given the nature and scope of the task at hand, no
justice can be done to the complexity and genius of Zubiri’s thought.
A more systematic elucidation of his position will need to be left for
another occasion. At this time only an outline of the general trajectory
of Zubiri’s argument can be provided, but this should sufce—mat least
it should point us in the right direction.
Zubiri's project can most succinctly be defined as an attempt to
push beyond what he argues is the pernicious idealism which has
plagued the Western philosophical tradition from the time of the Pre-
Socratics up to Heidegger, an idealism which is embedded in the very
structures of metaphysics and permeates all branches of philosophy—
e.g., anthropology, ethice, and the like. According to Zubiri, this
idealism is the result of two preoccupations which have misguided
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philosophers throughout the ages: (1) the ontological preoccupation
with the question of being, and (2) the epistemological preoccupation
with the question of the logos, This double fixation with being and
logos, Zubiri argues, has prevented philosophy from grasping reality as
the most primordial of philosophical categories, indeed, the history of
Western philosophy according to Zubiri is the history of the reduction
of reality to being and/or logos, i.e., the history of the spurious sub-
sumption of reality under the intellectualized categories of being and
logos l’armenides and Plato, for instance, directed their ontological in«
vestigations toward the question of the dialectic between being and
non-being, thus eclipsing the primacy of reality?7 Aristotle, Zubiri
argues, while moving in the right direction ontologically by under-
standing the problematic of being and non-being as ultimately a ques
tion of a physical totality,55 balked on the epistemological side by
reducing the knowing of a thing to an essence determined by its “defi-
nition/"W With the help of Avicena and Averroes,“ Aquinas appropri-
ated the basic form of Aristotelian epistemology, but reinterpreted
lreek ontology onto-theologically which allowed himM-via the anal-
ogy of being—«to relormulale the question of being and nonvbeing as
the question of being and existence, or being and becoming,“IZubiri
suggest that Descartes, like the Greeks and Scholastics betore him,
failed to grasp the primacy of reality over being, but rather understood
the two as interchangeable, Unlike the other three traditions, he re-
duced beinglreality to the yes cxtvnsa, and subordinated this res extrnsa
to the res cogitans, thus paving the way for Enlightenment “rationah
ism” and in particular "transcendental idealism/"12 Kant, with his
“Copernican Revolution” in metaphysics, radicalized Descartes by
arguing that being was not a real category, and reduced ontology to
epistemology, ie, reduced reality'being to "concepts” consciousness
brings to the manifold of sense impressions.“ Not being able to push
beyond the horizon of transcendental idealism, Husserl could not es-
cape the biases of this tradition although this was precisely the aim of
Xavier Zubirl, Estructum dimimirli de la rmilz'dad (Madrid: Alianza liditorial/
lituidacion Xavier Zubiri, 1989) llvlS.
“Slbidq l6~l7.
“”Xavier Zubiri, Sobri' la rsmutia (Madrid: Alianza Editorial/Fundacion Xavier
Zubiri, 1985) 75—84.
““lior [,ubiri’s analysis of the influence of Avicena and Averroes on Western
philosophy, see his Sabra r1 prolilmta dv la losry‘i‘u(Fundacion Xavier Zubiri, mi), in
particular the section entitled “in iilosolia iranio-islamica,” 71$).
"‘ Zubiri, 502m! [A asuncia, ‘94,
"7 livid, 4.
“-‘ nd, 373%»,
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his phenomenology. indeed, according to Zubiri, Husserl failed to
grasp the reality of objects, ie, the real of reality, because he could not
move past an understanding of consciousness as “inlentionality”—
thus he was never able to see that the most primordial function of con—
sciousness is ”actualization,“ Finally, with Heidegger, Zubiri argues,
there was a move in the right direction to the extent that he was able to
break with the biases of the philosophy of cons ousn —biases that
had resulted in the forgetfulness of being; or, more spec ally, in the
forgetfulness of the meaning of the being of beings. However, Heideg-
ger was never able to grasp the primacy of reality, due to his early
preoccupation with the analytic of Dwain, and the “ontic” and the
”ontological." indeed, he was never able to see that reality is prior to all
three-Daseim the ontic, and the ontological.“
Zubiri suggests that the different nuances of idealism which have
plagued Western philosophy can be unde oocl according to two
modes: (1) as the “logiiicacion de la intoleccion,” by which he means
the reduction of knowing reality to knowing the, logos, i.e., what we
called earlier the epistemological preoccupation with the logos; and (2)
as the ”entificacion de lo real,” by which he means the reduction of re—
ality to being, ie, what we called above the ontological preoccupation
with being. in the following passage Zubiri explains with exquisite
economy the adverse consequences of the two modes of idealism and
proposes what must be done to transcend them:
1,,(igificacion de la inteleccion y entitiracion de to real convergen asi in»
trinsecamente: el "es” de la inteleccion con.
'
'ria en un "es” aiirmativo,
y el “es” inteligido seria do cara’cter entitativo. Esta convergencia ha
trazado en buena medida 21 cause de la filosolia etiropeai Sin embargo, el
problema no presenta el mismo cara’cter desde una inteligencia sentiente,
El logos esta tundado en la aprehension sentienle Llli Io real; esto es, en
inteleccion sentiente. l’or tanto, en lugar de "logilicar" la inteleccion, lo
que ha de hacerse es, segun dije, "inteligixar" el logos; esto es, hacer clel
logos un modo ulterior de la aprehension primordial de lo real lil térr
mino formal del inteligir no es e1 “4: 3” sino la ”realiclad.” Y enloncet e—
sulta que realidad no es modo del ser, sino que el ser es algo ulterii a la
realidad misma, En su virtud, cumo he dicho . i , no hay asst) mile, sino
realitas in 955mm), No se puede entiiicar la realidad, sino que hay que dar
a la realidad una ulterioridad entitativa. La ulterioridad del logos Va "a
una" con la ulterioridad del ser mismo,m
"‘ lbid,, 2745i,
“3’ livid, 438434.
f"‘lbid,, 225, For an excellent summary of Zubiri’s critique of idealism under-
stood through the modes of the "logificacion de la inteleaion” and the “entitixacién
de la realidad” see lgnacio Ellacuria, ”lia superacidn Llel reduccionismo idealism en
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uThe “logificacit’m de la inteleccion” and the entificacion de lo real”
exist to a greater or lesser degree in all idealist systems, argues Zubiri.
If philosophy is to stay clear of both of these tendencies then it must
begin by understanding the proper structure of intelligence, which for
Zuhiri means coming to understand that the most primordial function
of intelligence is not reason or logos, but sentient upprehension,’ such
that intelligence is first and foremost sentient intelligence. Zubiri ar-
gues:
For so indole formal, la inteleccion m aptehension de la realidad en y por
si misnin. Esta inleleccion i . , es radicalmenl’e Lina aprehension de In
real que tiene caracteres propios, . i , La inteleccion es formalinente
aprehension directa de lo real, no a (raves de representaciones ni ima-
genes es una aprehen n inmediam de lo real, no tundada en inieren~
cias, razonamientos o cosa similar; es unn aprehension unitaria,W
Thus, the first and most primordial function of intelligence, according
to Zubiri, is the sentient apprehension of the real; then from here,
through more complex operations which build on or combine with this
sentient apprehension, intelligence is able to grasp reality as logos, and
ultimately as reason,08
For Zubiri, the ontological side of the problem of idealism, i,e., the
historical tendency of Western philosophy to subsume reality under
being, i inherently linked to this epistemological problem we have just
summarized Or stated more explicitly, for Zubiri, the “entificacién de
lo real" is inherently related to the ”logicacion de la inteleccion,” such
that once the proper structure of intelligence is discerned~«i,e., intelli»
gcnce is understood primarily as sentient apprehension——thenthe illu-
sion of an ontology grounded in being dissolves and reality is grasped
as the most primordial and primary of categories, l..,e as the groimd of
being and intelligence ln Zuhiri’ s own words, “La realidad no es un
modo de ser La realidad es justamente algo previo a! ser Y el sei' es
algo que estei tundado en la realidad como un dc $143103“And in a more
Yubiri,"£ mill mimanwriimzos (1988) 6 1 would like to thank Robert
Lasalle Morn l t ving called my attention to say.
" Xavier Zubiri, lnfr’ligmcza sentivnm/Intelieenciu y realidaa' (Madrid: Alianza
Editor ial/Fundai “an Xavier Zubiri, 1980/1991) 257
”l A concise schema of Zubiri's understanding of the structure of intelligence
can be discerned in the organization and ordering of the three books he wrote on
the subject: (l) lnlvli‘gr'nciasmittenls/lntsligemia y realidud, (2) Intrligencia y logos, and
(3) lmelz’gmriay mzrin, Taken together these, writings form his epistemological tril'
tlgyi
4‘" Zuhiri, l-‘structina dirm’mlm dc Iii malidlzd, Sill
A Critique of the “Aesthetic Turn" in US, Hispanic 'i'hcology 43
comprehensive fashion, in the conclusion to his second work on ontol-
ogy Zubiri writes:
Queria tratar en este estudio mio no solo do unos cuantos dinamismm
sueltos muy importantes en el mundo, y cada uno de ellos muy intere-
sante por 5i mismo. Me importaha tracer ver como todos ellos consti-
tnyen una unidad inlerna, y ademés intrinseca, que es el dinamismo
intrinseco, multivalente pert» perfectamente claro, de la realidad en tanto
que realidadi Una realidad qne comienzn por estai‘ y no hace m‘a’s que
variar, que entra on Si justamente haciéndose misma; one a lucrza de ser
mima so abre a la suidad, que se estatuye en l’orma de comunidad y se
estructura en la forma de un mundoi Hasta un cierto momenta y un
cierto limite solamente, porque la realidad es caduca, porque tiene un
limite en su propia realidadi , , , Esta es la cstructum dinémicu de la
realidad,m
Thus, for Zubiri, the ultimate object of both epistemology and ontology
is the dynamic structure of reality This is genuine transcendental phi—
losophymintramundane metaphysics,7l
But how does Zubiri’s critique of idealism and his radical notion of
reality prepare us for the task of laying a new ground for US. Hispanic
theology? For it seems we have gone adrift in the Vast and precarious
waters of the history of philosophy To this question the following
response is given: Zubiri’s polemic provides the framework and lanv
guage for a much needed critique of the intellectual genealogies of
US. Hispanic theology For at the very least, the conversation we had
with Goizueta problematizes the relationship between the aim oi
Latina / o theology and the philosophical, theoretical, and methodo.
logical resources used by Latina / o theologians Specifically our con-
versation with Goizueta raises the question of the appropriateness of
these resources for a theological project that aims to reflect upon the
everyday reality of Latinas/05 in the United States, Does US. Latina/o
theology fall captive to the idealist fallacies Zuhiri called to our atten-
tion—the “logilicacion de la inteleccion” and the "entitieacién de lo
real”? Do not the "aesthetic turn" in US, Hispanic theology and the
failure of Latina / o theologians to engage philosophical, theoretical,
and methodological resources that allow the monstrosity of oppression
to shine through suggest that indeed the answer to this question is in
the affirmative?
"‘ lbid., 327.
7’ lbid., 216i
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IL; ‘10 ELLAL'URlA AND ME Crmcavr or tlis‘i‘onicAL REALITY
Building on Zubiri’s transcendental realism, in his magnum opus,
Filosnfz’adc la riralidiid historzca,72 lgnacio Ellacuria argues that historical
reality is the proper object of philosophy as it is the preeminent mani~
festation of the dynamic structure of reality. With this appropriation
and interpretation of the Zubirian system we have a shit! from the
critique of idealism- vie, a critique of the history of philosophy—lo an
attempt to operationalize the form of this critique apropos the meta.
physics of the interrelationship between human being, society, and
history. Thus, in short, we encounter in Ellacuria a shift from the cate-
gories of reality, essence, intelligence, etc, to the categories of material-
ity, praxis, the social, the historical, and the like—«a shift analogous to
the move in the history of philosophy from Hegel to Feucrbach and
Marx.” Given this, it should not be surprising that Ellacuria’s philoso-
phy provides the ground for a project that sets out to replace the tradin
tional European theology of abstract consciousness with a theology of
concrete everyday reality. That Ellacuria’s notion of historical reality
should function as the ground for the paradigm we are delineating
here is not arbitrary but necessarily follows from the task us, Hispanic
theology how set for itself: to reflect upon us. Hispanic reality in its
everydayne, . The inevitability of this link will become clear from
what follows. But again we must state that no justice can be done to
Ellucuria’s thought in the limited space we have. A systematic treat.
ment of the implications of the notion of historical reality for US. His~
”San Salvador: UCA lil’litores, 1990.
7” Feuerbach argued that the starting point of philosophy must he not an ab-
stract religious/ theological presupposition, but rather a concrete anthropological
tact, Vizi, "real" and “sensuous" human being Thus, for instance, at the outset of his
great work, lieuerbach writes: "This philosophy has for its principle, not the Sub-
stance or Spinoza, not the ego of Kant and Ficl‘ite, not the Absolute. Identity of
Schelling, not the Absolute Mind of Hegel, in short, no abstract, merely conceptual
being, but u real being, the true Eris I'é’alissimmm-man; its principle, therefore, is in
the highest degree positive and real it generates through from the opposite of
thought, trom Matter, from existence, from the senses; it has relation to its objecti'
scs, iiei, pa sivoly, before defining it in thought.“ The ESscnar of
risliunily, trans. George iliot (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989) xv. This
critique which was directed primarily at the Hegelian system allowed Marx to
move away from the philosophical tradition that understood the human essence
through the primacy of consciousness, and toward a horizon that understood the
human essence through the primacy of materiality and sensibility. But Marx radi-
cali is the Feuerhachian position, arguing that although on the right track, Feuer-
bach continued to function at the level ol abstraction as understanding ”reality"
and ”sensuousne" theoretically and subjectively. See, for instance, Marx’s first
thesis on licuerhach in The Marxl‘ngals Realtor, 143.
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panic theology must be, left for another time, Our aim in what follows
can only be the circumscribed task of tracing~in broad strokes-”the
general contours of Ellacuria’s notion.
At the outset of Filusofia de la rcalz’dizd histi’irim Ellacuria posits the
following five theses which dene his point of departure and make
evident his appropriation of Zubiri’s transcendental realism: (1) “la
unidad de la realidad intramundana,”7" (2) ”cl carécter dinémico de la
realidad intramundana,”75 (3) cl caracter no universalmente dialec-
tico,”7“ (4) “el carécter procesual y ascendente de la realidad,”’7 and
(5) “la realidad historica como ohjeclo do la filosotia."”* With the first
four theses, Ellacuria emphasizes with Zubiri the dynamic and primor‘
dial character of reality, With the fifth thesis Ellacuria pushes beyond
Zubiri, arguing that the "historical” is the fullest and most complex
manifestation of reality, and thus it should be the ultimate object of
philosophical investigation. Ellacuria writes:
En efecto, la realidad his rica, ante todo, engloba todo otro tipo do real-
idad: no hay realidad hi, wica sin i‘ealidacl puramente material, sin real-
idad biological, sin realidad personal y sin realiciad social; en segunclo
lugar, toda forma de realidad dondo dd mas LlQ si y dondc recibc su para
qué fricticrr—no necesariamentc iinnlistico was en la roalidacl histOrica;
en tcrcer lugar, esa forma do realidad que es la realidad historical es
donde la realidad es ”mils” y dondo es "més suya,” dondc tamhién es
“mas abierta.”
For Zubiri idealism could not be overcome until reality was under-
stood as the primordial category. For Ellacm'ia a reductionistic under
standing of history can not be overcome until the qualitatively different
“Ellacuria develops this first thesis thus: “Toda la realidad intramunclana cow
stituye Lina sole unidad iisica compleja y diterenciuda, do modo que ni la unitlacl
anula las diferencias ni las diforencias anulan la unload.” lhid., CH.
79 He explains: “La realidad intramunclana es intrinsecamente dinzimica, do
modo que la pregunta por el origen del movimiento es one false pregunta 0, al
menos, una pregunta socundaria.” lbidi, 33.
7“Or more explicitly stated, "La realidad siendo cn si misma sistemc’iticn, estruc—
tural y unitaria, no es necariamente dialécticu 0, al menos, no es univocamente
clialéctica," ll)id., 35.
77 More concretely: "La reulidacl no solo torma una toialidnd dinamica, estru<~
rural y, en algun motto, dialectica, sino true es un proceso dc- realizacion, en el cual
se van dando cada vez. iormas ma’s altas do zealiclad, one retienen las antei‘iores,
elevanclolasi” livid, 38‘
7" By which lillacuria means that ”La ’realidud historica/ es cl 'ohjecto iiltirno’ de
la filosofia, entericlida como metafisica intrmnundana, no solo por su (:aracter
englobante y totalizador, sino en cuanto manilestacion supreme) do la realiddd."
lbid,, 42.
“lbidu 43,
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moments of historical reality are grasped from the most basic—Le, ma-
teriality-40 the most developed—vie, the historical itself. In a word,
history cannot be understood as real history, that is, as historical reality,
without understanding the material, biological, natural, personal, and
social moments that constitute it as real history, as the historical mo-
ment of the dynamic structure of reality. So, for instance, a failure to
grasp the way in which history is. grounded in and unfolds from nature
leads to an idealist underatanding of this reality. Conversely, the failure
to understand how history transcends nature, i.e., cannot be reduced to
nature, leads to a vulgar materialist understanding of the samef’“ Simi-
larly, a failure to grasp the way in which human praxis is grounded in
and unfolds from poiesis leads to an idealist understanding of praxis;
conversely, a failure to grasp the way in which praxis transcends
poieeis leads to a reductionistic View of prairiem Thus, for Ellacuria to
understand historical reality is to understand reality in its multiplex
and totalizing character. He explains:
A este ultimo estadio de la realidad, en el cual se hacen presenters todos
los demas es al que llamamos realidad historica: en el, la realidad es mas
realidad, porque se halla toda la realidad anterior, pero en esa modalidad
que venimos llamando historica. Es la realidad entera, asumida en el
reino social de la libertad. Es la realidad mostrando sus mas ricas virtual,
idades y posibilidades, ai‘m en estado dinamico de desarrollo, pero ya
alcanzado el nivel cualitativo metafisico desde el mismo subsuelo de la
realidad histories: y sin dejair ya de ser intramundanamente realidad
histr’irica."2
For Ellacuria, then, the grasping of historical reality is transcendental
philosophy~it is intramundane metaphysics, but, unlike Zubiri’s, El-
lacuria/s system has a praxeologiml intent.“
”For example, at one point lillacuria argues: ”Creer que la hi
ver con la evolucion hiologica una forma de idealisnio y de tals cion de la his,
toria; pero, al mismo iiempn, r quc la historia sustancialmente lo mismo que
la eyelucion es también una fals ticacion de la historio, un materialismo injustili~
cado de la historia, um naturali’ cion injusticnda de lo historico.” lbid,, 49,
“‘ Ellacuria writes: "Aristoteles contraponia la praxis a la poiesis, atribuyendo a
la poiesis el careleter de una actividad que el hombre ejecuta sobre las cosas o sabre
si mismo en tanto que cosa, mientn
‘
que a praxis le atribuia el caracter de una
actividad, que no tiene mas {in que Sl misma. concepcion supone que el hombre
puede haeerse a si mismr t sin hacer lo otro que si, que puede err-arse sin crear. Y esto
no es asi.” lbidi, 594.
“3 livid, 43,
mAlthough this point cannot be developed here, it should he noted that it was
already implicit in what was said above by way of the analogy Zubiri:Ellacuria :
Hegeklieuerbach /Marx. See n, 73.
a no tiene que
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From what has been said it should be clear why Ellacuria’s notion
of historical reality provides the metaphysical ground for the construc-
tion of a theology that aims to reflect upon the everydayness of US.
Latino reality: grounded in this notion and guided by it, US. Hispanic
theology would not limit itself to the religious sphere and to religious
praxis but, rather, it would attempt to grasp the religious dimension in
all spheres—political, economic, cultural, and the likeuas well as
explore the way in which the economic, political, cultural spheres affect
Hispanic religiosity. But such a perspective is not possible when the
ground of the paradigm is aesthetic theory; indeed, it is only possible if
we take as the ground historical reality.
LomoNt; AHEAD: THE PHENoivirNoroov or 811' -
PROPER Form or DEPAR’X‘URFor us. HISPANIC Ti Ir.
Up to this point we have developed the notion of historical reality
as a formal metaphysical principle. in the next stage of our paradigm
which cannot be developed here due to the limited space available, we
will need to move from a discussion of the strictly formal metaphysical
treatment of this notion to an existential analysis f the historical reality
of a specific group of people: US. Hispanics his is to say, in other
words, our next move must be an attempt to flesh out what we under‘
stand to be the historical reality of US i‘lispan But, it we are to be
true to the implications of Ellacuria's notion of historical reality, then
we must begin to delineate US. Hispanic historical reality by searching
for that existential characteristic that is not only present among a
heterogeneous US. Latino population, but a characteristic that suffuses
all regions of us. Hispanic lite—familial, religious, economic, socio—
cultural, political, and the like. In a word, we must begin to delineate
US Hispanic historical reality by searching for its most primordial
characteristic. The trajectory having been outlined, l bring this e ‘ ‘
Closure with the following claim: the primordial characteri.
Hispanic historical reality is the phmommolow tifstmggle, Thus, it is the
phenomenology of struggle that needs to serve as the proper point of
departure for a theological project that aims to grasp the everyday
historical reality of U5. Latinas/o5. Hence, a future essay would need
to: (l) elucidate what is meant by the phenomenology of struggle;
(2) redefine relevant terminology given this new point of departure;
(3) delineate the different regions or moments of US Hispanic histori-
cal reality; and (4) develop a theological method that reects the total—
ity of this reality
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Resumcn:
Ham: mm w'itiaz d3] giro van? on on In molagz’aIn'spano—estadoum’dmse:
Ull tiiiogucon Roberto Goizzwta y a] plmlteamié’nlodc 1m mama paradigm:
Esta pmwncia pretendc elaborar una critica de lo que aqui
llamamos e! “giro estético” en la teologia hispano—estadounidenso, es
decir, una critica dc Ids dos wracteristicas que delimitan cl quehacer
teulthico latinu en los Estados Unidos hoy en dia: (1) 1a reicacién de
las experienciaa religio—eslétims hispanas y (2) e1 intenm dc fundar un
discursu twc’wgicoen un sistema filoséco—teérim estético‘ Sintomético
de este ”giro” es: (1) {a “intelectualizacién” (qua ”estetizacidn”) de la re»
alidad cotidimm latina; (2) la 9301; de investigationes sobre la
relacic’m untre Ids condicioncs dc oprealén—estmcturales y simbélicas
-—y 1&5 practicas religiosas de los hisparms en 105 Estados Unidos; y
(3) la dicotomizacién dis la x‘ealidnd hismrica latina entre la praxis y la
puiesis, 105 campus seculares y el campo religioso, la procesién y la pro-
ducién/ 1a liturgia y la labor, la fiesta y la factoria,
En el primer apartado matizamos y concretizamos 10$ degaos del
mencionado “giro estético” a través de um conversacién con Roberto
Goizueta sob re e1 argumenm que éste elabom en 10$ capitulos cuatro y
cinco de su libro Camimmvs am [68115,En luz de este diémgo, condui-
mos que las limitaciones filosécos, teéricos/ y memdolégicos que
subyacen 01 ”giro estético” no permiten a la teologia hispano-
estadounidense caplar la totalidad de [a realidad cotidiana lat'mzr—hito
cumbre de este quehacer.
En el segundo apartadu planteamos un paradigma que pretende
superar dichas IimitacionESv—un paradigma que intenta fundar la
teologfa hispano-estadounidense en simientos filoséficos y teéricos
ma’s solidos y estables, simiemos que permitirian que esta teologia
capte de una manera totalizante 1a realidad histérica latina‘ Hacia este
fin, claboramos las dos primeras fases de dicho paradigma y bosque-
jamos la terceraA I’rimem, apropriando la critica de Xavier Zubiri en
tornu a} idealismo filoséfico occidental~~-esto es, contra lo que éste
llama la ”enticacién de 10 real" y la "logificacic’mde la inteleccién”—
desatamos el problemtico trasfondo filoséfico-teorico de la men'
Cionado tenlogia. Segundo, ubicamos y desarrollamos e1 concepto
Ellacurianu, ”realidad histérica,” como el gimiento meta’sico (is dicha
teolugim Y tercero, trasladandonos del horimnte formal a1 horizonte
existencial, ahugamos 1a “fennmenologia de la lucha” como el autén~
lieu punto de partida de la teologia latina en 105 Estados Unidos,
